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POWER TO THE PEOPLE: ALLOWING PRIVATE PARTIES
TO RAISE CLAIMS BEFORE THE WTO DISPUTE
RESOLUTION SYSTEM
Glen T. Schleyer*
INTRODUCTION
The World Trade Organization (the "WTO") is currently embroiled
in a political controversy that threatens to tear it apart. The contro-
versy involves a complaint that the European Union has filed with the
WTO dispute resolution system alleging that recent U.S. legislation is
in contravention of international law.1 The legislation at issue is the
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996,2
better known as the Helms-Burton Act (the "Act"). The Act allows
U.S. courts to impose sanctions on companies, both U.S. and foreign,
that do business in Cuba.3 The European Union alleges that the Act
is "an illegal effort to force Europe, Canada and Mexico to join the
American effort to isolate Castro."4
Sound legal arguments can be made both for and against the valid-
ity of the Helms-Burton Act,5 but it is likely that the soundness of
these arguments will have nothing to do with the ultimate outcome of
the dispute. The United States is trying to use its vast political and
economic power to prevent the question from ever coming before a
WTO dispute resolution panel.6 The United States has been pressur-
ing the European Union to drop the case completely, and the Euro-
pean Union recently succumbed to this pressure somewhat by
requesting a delay in the formation of a panel.7
This political imbroglio could lead to the premature end of the
WTO.8 The WTO, which officially came into existence on January 1,
1995,1 was the culmination of trade negotiations lasting nearly a dec-
* This note is dedicated to my wife, Monica, and to my family.
1. David E. Sanger, Europe Postpones Challenge to U.S. on Havana Trade, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 13, 1997, at Al.
2. 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6021-6091 (1996).
3. Id §§ 6081-6082. More specifically, the Act gives a cause of action to U.S.
nationals whose property in Cuba was seized by the Castro regime without compensa-
tion. Under the statute, entities that do business in Cuba are trafficking in the stolen
property of these U.S. nationals and can be held accountable. Id.; see Steven E. Hen-
drix, Tensions in Cuban Property Law, 20 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L Rev. 1, 82-83
(1996).
4. Sanger, supra note 1, at Al.
5. See id. at A9 (noting that "[e]xperts disagree on whether Europe would win its
case if it went before the [WTO dispute resolution] panel").
6. See id. at Al.
7. Id
8. Id.
9. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Final Act Embodying
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994,
Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 1 (1994). 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144
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ade. It was the first international organization charged with the re-
sponsibility of overseeing the world trading system, 10 and within six
months of its creation, 100 countries had accepted membership." Ac-
companying the WTO's creation was a battery of new trade agree-
ments which reduced tariffs and other trade barriers to lower levels
than ever before.' 2
One of the most significant changes made by the WTO was the cre-
ation of a new centralized procedure for resolving trade-related dis-
putes. Because of the peculiar history 13 of the WTO's predecessor,
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade' 4 (the "GATT"), the
pre-WTO dispute resolution system was primarily developed in an ad
hoc, disorganized fashion. As a result, the system was extremely sus-
ceptible to political gamesmanship and diplomatic power struggles
among nations. The outcomes of trade disputes were subject to the
vagaries and capriciousness of international relations, instead of a fair
and impartial interpretation of the underlying treaties.'5
The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settle-
ment of Disputes,'16 an annex to the WTO Charter, was a major im-
provement over the prior system. It greatly diminished the ability of
large nations to use their power to derail the dispute resolution pro-
cess. This depoliticization of dispute resolution advanced the WTO's
stated goal of "providing security and predictability to the multilateral
trading system.' 7 Under the new system, the outcome of trade dis-
putes is less dependent on the power of the nations involved and more
dependent on a fair and logical application of the trade agreements.
The current debate over the Helms-Burton Act, however, shows
that the depoliticization process is far from over. Political motivations
and diplomatic gamesmanship can still have a crippling effect on the
(1994) [hereinafter WTO Charter]; Philip M. Nichols, GATT Doctrine, 36 Va. J. Int'l
L. 379, 380 n.1 (1996) [hereinafter Nichols, GATT Doctrine].
10. See John H. Jackson, The Uruguay Round and the Launch of the WTO: Signif-
icance & Challenges, in The World Trade Organization: The Multilateral Trade
Framework for the 21st Century and U.S. Implementing Legislation 5, 10-11 (Terence
P. Stewart ed., 1996) [hereinafter Jackson, Uruguay Round].
11. Terence P. Stewart, Introduction to The World Trade Organization: The Mul-
tilateral Trade Framework for the 21st Century and U.S. Implementing Legislation,
supra note 10, at 1, 1.
12. See Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization Dis-
putes to Nongovernment Parties, 17 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 295, 296 (1996) [hereinafter
Nichols, Extension of Standing].
13. See infra text accompanying notes 24-41.
14. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
15. See infra notes 66-77.
16. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 1(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1226 (1994) [hereinafter Understanding].
17. Id art. 3(2).
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WTO dispute resolution system. The root of this problem is found in
the WTO provision that allows only nations to challenge illegal trade
practices.' 8 Such a system ensures that the initial filing of a dispute
and its continued vitality will be profoundly susceptible to political
subversion. No matter how egregious a trade violation is, if no gov-
ernment is willing to take the political risk associated with initiating a
dispute, the illicit trade policy will continue. Moreover, allowing only
nations to challenge illegal trade practices can lead to a souring of
international relations, as the Helms-Burton dispute illustrates. Just
as under the GATT, countries' political motivations can still distort
and declaw the powerful WTO dispute resolution system.
All these problems could be mitigated by allowing private parties to
initiate disputes before the WTO. Private parties-both individuals
and companies-that do business in Cuba are the entities most di-
rectly injured by the Helms-Burton Act. They are faced with the
choice of either forgoing potentially profitable ventures or opening
themselves up to liability under the Act. This choice is made more
difficult by the United States' political maneuvering-not only do
these private parties have to predict whether the Helms-Burton Act
would be deemed valid, but they have to predict whether a determina-
tion of its validity will occur at all.
If private parties could initiate disputes over the legitimacy of a na-
tion's actions, then a ruling on the merits would be virtually assured.
Private parties would not be susceptible to political pressures in the
same way as nations. Moreover, a claim raised by a private party
against a nation, unlike a claim raised by one nation against another,
would not be injurious to international relations because the claim
could not be interpreted as a diplomatic attack or maneuver.
Private parties are the primary actors in world trade today,19 and it
is their investments and efforts that are harmed by illicit trade policies.
Global compliance with trade agreements is essential if the people of
the world are to fully reap the economic benefits of free trade. The
only adequate way to ensure global compliance and advance the
WTO's goal of lending more stability and predictability to interna-
tional trade is to let private parties, not just nations, initiate disputes.
Part I of this Note summarizes the formation, history, and philoso-
phy of both the GATI and the WTO, with an emphasis on their re-
spective dispute resolution systems. Part II analyzes the competing
political philosophies that have guided the development of world
trade dispute resolution over the past fifty years. Part HI then argues
that a rule-oriented approach to dispute resolution, as opposed to a
power-oriented approach, has been and should continue to be the
18. See id art. 3.
19. See G. Richard Shell, The Trade Stakeholders Model and Participation by Non-
state Parties in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L 359, 367
(1996) [hereinafter Shell, Trade Stakeholders Model].
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trend. In addition, part II discusses the benefits that greater private
participation would confer upon a rule-oriented dispute resolution
system. Part III reviews various mechanisms for enhancing private
participation in the WTO other than actual standing, and concludes
that each one is either unworkable or would inadequately protect the
interests of private parties. Finally, part IV examines the different
thresholds for standing that the WTO could use and concludes that
standing should be available to any private party who has actually suf-
fered some loss or damage because of an allegedly prohibited trade
practice. Furthermore, part IV recommends the creation of a com-
mission within the WTO that would evaluate, organize, and process
private-party complaints.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE GATr AND THE WTO
The current world trading system has its roots in the years immedi-
ately following World War II, when Western nations sought to elimi-
nate the protectionist and discriminatory trade practices that had
helped inflame international animosity and alienation between the
World Wars. An analysis of the history and development of the two
major entities governing world trade-first the GATT, then the
WTO-will be useful in contextualizing the problems surrounding
world trade today.
A. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
The GATT was the the first real attempt by the major nations of the
world to create a cohesive system of world trade regulation. This part
discusses the development and major characteristics of the GATT, as
well as the attributes, advantages, and drawbacks of the GATT dis-
pute resolution system.
1. Development of the GATI
In June of 1944, while the Allied forces tore through Europe, repre-
sentatives of the Allied nations met in Bretton Woods, New Hamp-
shire.2" With the end of World War II in sight, these nations
recognized the need to address the financial and economic problems
that had contributed to the Great Depression and the War.2 Because
the participants in the Bretton Woods Conference were from the fi-
nance ministries of their respective governments, they placed an em-
phasis on financial and banking matters, not on trade issues.22 At the
20. Representatives of 44 nations participated in the Bretton Woods Conference.
Richard Myrus, Note, From Bretton Woods to Brussels: A Legal Analysis of the Ex-
change-Rate Arrangements of the International Monetary Fund and the European
Community, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 2095, 2096-97 (1994).
21. John H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International
Economic Relations 31 (1989) [hereinafter Jackson, World Trading System].
22. IL at 31-32.
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end of the Conference, the participants had established the charters of
two major international financial entities-the International Mone-
tary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment (better known as the World Bank).23
The Bretton Woods participants also recognized the need for a third
international organization-one that would oversee the area of world
trade.' The protectionist measures that had arisen during the two
decades between the World Wars had hampered international trade,
and most nations felt that this obstruction of free trade was a major
factor contributing to the Depression and the War.25 Shortly after the
Bretton Woods Conference, the United States and the United King-
dom proposed the creation of an International Trade Organization
(the "ITO").26 The newly-formed United Nations was charged with
the task of creating a charter for the ITO. 7
The nations participating in this unprecedented multinational effort,
however, were eager to enjoy the benefits of free trade and did not
want to wait until the ITO could get on its feet.28 As an interim mea-
sure, they decided to draft and enter into a multinational trade agree-
ment that would regulate international trade until the ITO could take
over.29 This provisional arrangement was the GAIT, and in 1947 the
participating nations signed a Protocol of Provisional Application,
which put the GAIT into force.30
In the meantime, the ITO was running into problems. The pro-
posed charter for the ITO was extremely ambitious and set numerous
limits on the actions that participating nations could take in interna-
tional trade.31 As a result, in 1950, the United States Congress, hesi-
tant to cede too much power, refused to ratify the charter.32 As the
only world power whose economy was not ravaged by World War II,
the United States had tremendous influence, and its refusal to ratify
23. l at 31; Jackson, Uruguay Round, supra note 10, at 5.
24. Jackson, Uruguay Round, supra note 10, at 5; Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra
note 9, at 388.
25. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 21, at 31; Miquel MontaiI4 i Mora,
A GATT with Teeth: Law Wins over Politics in the Resolution of International Trade
Disputes, 31 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 103, 106-07 (1993).
26. Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra note 9, at 389.
27. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 21, at 32; Jackson, Uruguay Round,
supra note 10, at 5; Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra note 9, at 389.
28. Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra note 9, at 389.
29. Jackson, Uruguay Round, supra note 10, at 5-6; Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra
note 9, at 389.
30. GATT, supra note 14. The nations signing the GATT were: Australia,
Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia,
France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paki-
stan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. Id
31. Jackson, Uruguay Round, supra note 10, at 6.
32. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 21, at 34; Jackson, Uruguay Round,
supra note 10, at 6; Nichols, GA7T Doctrine, supra note 9, at 389-90.
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the ITO charter effectively ensured that the Organization would never
come into being.33
The untimely death of the ITO left a void in international trade
regulation. The GATT, which was intended to be merely temporary,
became by default the primary entity governing international trade.'
Of course, the GATT was merely an agreement, without the force of a
treaty and certainly without the power and presence of an organiza-
tion.35 The mismatch between the GATT's initial conception and its
ultimate function manifested itself in a number of ways, including the
artificial "leasing" of its staff from the non-existent IT0 36 and the lack
of any guiding constitution or charter.37
The inauspicious birth of the GATT raised the concern that it would
not survive the contentious nature of international trade. As it turned
out, however, the GATT proved tremendously beneficial to world
trade over the next fifty years. 8 Perhaps its most important function
was forming the basis of ongoing trade negotiations, called "trade
rounds," which resulted in diminished tariffs. 9 In time, the GATT
developed such a penumbra of procedures and rules that it eventually
became a de facto international organization.4" As Professor John H.
Jackson writes, "[t]hat it could do so, despite the flawed basic docu-
ments on which it had to build, is a tribute to the pragmatism and
ingenuity of many of its leaders over the years." 4 1
2. Obligations Imposed by the GATT
The GATIT's drafters intended it to be instrumental in combating
the high tariffs and other protectionist measures that had contributed
to the Great Depression and World War 11.42 To this end, Article II of
33. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 21, at 34; Nichols, GATT Doctrine,
supra note 9, at 390. Ironically, it was the United States that had initially proposed
the creation of the ITO. This change in position was effected by numerous factors,
including a post-war desire for a normalization of international relations and the shift
of the U.S. Congress to Republican control in 1948. Jackson, World Trading System,
supra note 21, at 34.
34. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 21, at 37; Jackson, Uruguay Round,
supra note 10, at 6; MontafiA i Mora, supra note 25, at 107; Nichols, GATT Doctrine,
supra note 9, at 390.
35. Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra note 9, at 390.
36. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 21, at 37; Nichols, GATT Doctrine,
supra note 9, at 390.
37. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 21, at 38.
38. Jackson, Uruguay Round, supra note 10, at 6.
39. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 21, at 52-3; Phillip R. Trimble, In-
ternational Trade and the "Rule of Law," 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1016, 1020 (1985) (review-
ing John H. Jackson et al., Implementing the Tokyo Round: National Constitutions
and International Economic Rules (1984)).
40. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 21, at 38.
41. Id.
42. 1l at 31. In the preamble to the GATT, the Contracting Parties manifested
their desire to "enter[ ] into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements di-
rected to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the
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the GATT prohibits the participating nations, called "Contracting
Parties," from imposing any import restrictions other than tariffs and
also limits the tariffs that can be imposed.43 Between the adoption of
the GATT and its replacement by the WTO," the Contracting Parties
repeatedly lowered the tariff limits referred to in Article H .45 Eventu-
ally, the tariffs reached such low levels as to present no real impedi-
ment to free trade.46
In addition to the tariff reductions, the GAT also places limits on
the internal laws and regulations of the Contracting Parties. Specifi-
cally, each nation's treatment of imports from another Contracting
Party must satisfy two doctrinal principles of non-discriminatory treat-
ment set forth by the GATT. These are referred to as "most-favored-
nation treatment"'47 and "national treatment."4'
Article I of the GATT sets forth the most-favored-nation obliga-
tion.49 Under this article, one Contracting Party cannot be given pref-
erential treatment over another country. Instead, the imports from,
and exports to, each Contracting Party must be afforded equitable
treatment with respect to customs procedures and all other import- or
export-related regulations. In effect, each nation must "grant to every
other contracting party the most favorable treatment that it grants to
any country.
50
elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce." GATT, supra
note 14, pmbL
43. GAIT, supra note 14, art. II; Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 21, at
115, 118-19; Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra note 9, at 387.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 78-82 (discussing the replacement of GATI
by the WTO).
45. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 21, at 52-3; Trimble, supra note 39,
at 1020.
46. See Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 21, at 53; see also Nichols,
GATT Doctrine, supra note 9, at 387 (noting that the Contracting Parties anticipated
that tariff limits "were to be negotiated down so that eventually trade among nations
would be virtually unfettered").
47. GATT, supra note 14, art. I.
48. Id. arL I.
49. IL art. 1(1).
50. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 21, at 133; accord Nichols, GAiT
Doctrine, supra note 9, at 386. Article I(1) reads in relevant part as follows:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in
connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international
transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method
of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formali-
ties in connection with importation and exportation .... any advantage,
favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any prod-
uct originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded imme-
diately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for
the territories of all other contracting parties.
GATT, supra note 14, art. I(1). For a discussion of the economic and political advan-
tages of most-favored-nation treatment, see Jackson, World Trading System, supra
note 21, at 134-36.
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The second type of non-discrimination is national treatment, set
forth in Article III of the GATT.5  Under this doctrine, the domestic
laws of a Contracting Party must treat goods imported from another
Contracting Party no less favorably than comparable domestically-
produced goods once the goods have entered the domestic market. 2
3. GATI Dispute Resolution
In expectation that Contracting Parties would occasionally disagree
about the interpretation and application of GATT provisions, the
GATT provides a procedure for resolution of trade disputes. Like the
rest of the GATr, this procedure, set forth in Article XXIII, was in-
tended to be merely provisional. Therefore, it does not exhaustively
detail every step of the process, and much of the ultimate dispute res-
olution procedure was embodied in customs and practices developed
by the Contracting Parties while resolving actual disputes.5
The foundation of the GATT dispute resolution system is Article
XXIII. 4 The system is triggered when a Contracting Party deter-
mines that a benefit accruing to it under the GATT is being "nullified
or impaired" by the actions of another Contracting Party.55 The
GATT requires the nations involved to try to resolve the dispute be-
tween themselves before bringing the dispute to the other Contracting
Parties. The first step the complaining nation must take is to "make
written representations or proposals" to the nation it believes to be
51. GATr, supra note 14, art. IlI(1)-(2).
52. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 21, at 189; Nichols, GATT Doc-
trine, supra note 9, at 386. Article III reads in relevant part as follows:
1. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be exempt from internal taxes
and other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied directly or
indirectly to like products of national origin. Moreover, in cases in which
there is no substantial domestic production of like products of national ori-
gin, no contracting party shall apply new or increased internal taxes on the
products of the territories of other contracting parties for the purpose of
affording protection to the production of directly competitive or substitut-
able products which are not similarly taxed; and existing internal taxes of
this kind shall be subject to negotiation for their reduction or elimination.
2. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect
of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering
for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution, or use.
GATr, supra note 14, art. III(1)-(2).
53. See Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 21, at 94; Nichols, GATT Doc-
trine, supra note 9, at 393-94.
54. In addition, Article XXII contains provisions that encourage consultations be-
tween Contracting Parties. This article, however, does not provide for further action
in the event that consultations fail. See GATT, supra note 14, art. XXII; Jackson,
World Trading System, supra note 21, at 94; Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra note 9, at
392.
55. GATT, supra note 14, art. XXIII(1); Jackson, World Trading System, supra
note 21, at 94; Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra note 9, at 392.
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acting in contravention of the GAT. 6 The other nation must "give
sympathetic consideration" to these representations and proposals. s5
If the parties are unable to resolve the dispute themselves, Article
XXIII allows the complaining party to bring the complaint before the
other Contracting Parties, who will investigate and make appropriate
recommendations.5 8 In the early years of the GATT, disputes were
taken up at a meeting of all the Contracting Parties. 9 Because this
proved too inefficient and time-consuming for most disputes, the
Contracting Parties developed an alternate method, under which a
working party would investigate the dispute and make a recom-
mendation.6° The working party generally consisted of representa-
tives of the disputing countries and of a few neutral countries.6 '
In the mid-1950s, a third option became prevalent-the use of an
impartial panel, composed of three to five trade experts. The experts
were to decide the matter fairly and impartially and were not to act as
representatives of their respective governments.' After considering
the arguments of both parties, and of interested third parties, the
panel would issue a report detailing its findings and
recommendations. 63
The panel report had no legal effect unless it was adopted by con-
sensus of the Contracting Parties. Therefore, the losing party could
effectively block adoption of the report by voting against it.,' If the
panel ruled in favor of the complaining nation and if the report was
then adopted, the Contracting Parties were authorized to take action
against the losing nation. If "circumstances [were] serious enough to
justify such action," the Contracting Parties could authorize the com-
plaining nation to retaliate against the losing nation by denying it any
benefits that accrue to it under the GATI'?5
The GATT dispute resolution system worked remarkably well in its
early years. Because of "the homogeneity of the initial contracting
parties and the consensus in support of the GATT rules," compliance
56. GATY, supra note 14, art. XXIII(1).
57. Id.
58. Id art. XXi(2).
59. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 21, at 95; see Nichols, GAT Doc-
trine, supra note 9, at 393.
60. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 21, at 95; Nichols, GAT Doctrine,
supra note 9, at 393-94.
61. Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra note 9, at 393-94.
62. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 21, at 95; Nichols, GAT Doctrine,
supra note 9, at 394; G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations
Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 Duke L.J 829, 841 (1995)
[hereinafter Shell, Trade Legalism].
63. Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra note 9, at 396.
64. Id at 396-97; Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 62, at 842; Shell, Trade Stake-
holders Model, supra note 19, at 365; Michael K. Young, Dispute Resolution in the
Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph over Diplomats, 29 Int'l Law. 389, 392 (1995).
65. GATT, supra note 14, art. XXIII(2); Young, supra note 64, at 392.
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with the system was the norm.66 In the 1950s and 1960s, however, as
more nations became Contracting Parties, this policy cohesion
faltered, and the "decision-making process became more
cumbersome. 67
The dispute resolution system began to grow more susceptible to
increasingly fractious political considerations. One of the first blows
to the credibility of the system came in 1955, when the United States
used its political influence and power to get the other Contracting Par-
ties to waive certain U.S. obligations regarding agricultural products.68
The potential political fallout of panel decisions began to undermine
their effectiveness as panels intentionally wrote ambiguously worded
opinions in politically sensitive areas.69
The structure of the system itself was overly susceptible to political
influence. The consensus requirement for adopting panel decisions
meant that one party could block the decision by voting against it.
Therefore, the losing nation could effectively veto any legal effect of
the recommendation.7 ° As a result of this tepid adoption procedure,
only one panel decision resulted in the authorization of retaliation by
the Contracting Parties in the entire history of the GATT.7 1 Even in
this case, which resulted from a complaint by the Netherlands against
the United States,72 political considerations forestalled application of
the authorized retaliation, and the initial trade violation continued un-
abated.73 Another political upshot of the consensus requirement was
that countries "occasionally withheld approval of a panel report in re-
taliation for some country's unwillingness to allow adoption of a panel
report favorable to the first country."'74
In response to the growing ineffectiveness of the dispute resolution
system, nations relied increasingly on unilateral threats and trade
sanctions to resolve their trade-related differences. 75 The United
States was particularly eager to resort to unilateral measures, a pro-
pensity that aggravated many of its trading partners and led to greater
tension in the international arena.76 When the Contracting Parties
met in the mid-1980s to overhaul the international trade system, the
66. Montai i Mora, supra note 25, at 108; see Robert E. Hudec, The GATT Legal
System and World Trade Diplomacy 190 (1975).
67. Montafi i Mora, supra note 25, at 108; see Hudec, supra note 66, at 193.
68. MontafiA i Mora, supra note 25, at 119-20.
69. Hudec, supra note 66, at 137-39.
70. See supra text accompanying note 64.
71. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 21, at 96; Shell, Trade Stakeholders
Model, supra note 19, at 365.
72. In 1953, the Netherlands raised a complaint about U.S. restraints on imported
dairy products. The Contracting Parties authorized the Netherlands to retaliate by
limiting U.S. grain imports. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 21, at 96.
73. a d
74. Young, supra note 64, at 402.
75. Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra note 9, at 398-99.
76. Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 62, at 844-45.
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growing impotence of the GATT dispute resolution process was a ma-
jor issue that they needed to resolve.'
B. The World Trade Organization
The next major step in the development of international trade regu-
lation was the creation of the WTO. This part discusses the history of
the WTO and, in particular, the improvements made to the process of
resolving international trade disputes.
1. Formation of the WTO
The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, which commenced in
1986, was an attempt to completely revamp and streamline the inter-
national trade system. The de facto procedures that had arisen
around the GATT were proving unworkable in a number of areas,
including dispute resolution, as discussed above.78 In addition, the
GAIT failed to cover several areas of vital importance to world trade,
including services and intellectual property.79 The Contracting Parties
felt that the time had finally come to establish an international trade
organization to integrate and oversee world trade.
The Uruguay Round resulted in the formation of the WTO, which
officially came into existence on January 1, 1995.80 The WTO was
formed to be more than just the successor to the GAT-it was in-
tended to supersede and encompass the GATT, as well as all the sub-
sequent trade negotiations and procedures. The preamble to the
WTO Charter states that the participating nations are resolved "to
develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading
system encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
the results of past trade liberalization efforts, and all of the results of
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations."'" Accompa-
nying the creation of the WTO were a series of renegotiated trade
agreements, including an updated version of the GATT known as
GATT 1994. 2
2. WTO Dispute Resolution
The system for resolving international trade disputes underwent
major changes as a result of the Uruguay Round. The VTO Charter
contains an Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
77. Id at 845-48.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 68-74.
79. Jackson, Uruguay Round, supra note 10, at 8. Moreover, for a variety of rea-
sons, the GATT provisions regarding agriculture went largely unheeded by the Con-
tracting Parties. Id
80. WTO Charter, supra note 9, art. I; Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra note 9, at
380 n.1.
81. WTO Charter, supra note 9, pmbl.
82. Id. at 1140.
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Settlement of Disputes83 (the "Understanding") which details the
proper dispute resolution procedures in much greater detail than the
GATr.' The Understanding makes six important modifications to
the system for resolving trade disputes. When viewed together, these
changes show that the new WTO system is a much more powerful and
authoritative tool for resolving disputes than the GATT system.
The first major change is the creation of a single entity, the Dispute
Settlement Body (the "DSB"), to oversee all disputes.85 Because the
GATT lacked such an overarching commission, there was an opportu-
nity for parties to forum-shop for the particular dispute resolution
mechanism that best suited their objectives.86 The formation of the
DSB reduced the threat of inconsistent decisions that forum-shopping
typically raises.
A second modification made by the Understanding is the creation
of an appellate procedure. In a clear attempt to make the dispute
resolution system more consistent, fair, and effective, the Understand-
ing gives parties the right to appeal panel decisions to the Appellate
Body. 7 The Appellate Body is a permanent court made up of seven
judges appointed by the DSB.s8
Third, the Understanding repairs a major weakness of the GATT
system by making adoption of the panel and Appellate Body decisions
virtually automatic. Adoption of a decision can only be forestalled if
all the member nations, including the winning nation, agree by con-
sensus not to adopt it.89 Under the GATT, the losing party could sin-
gle-handedly derail a panel decision by voting against it;9 under the
WTO, in contrast, the winning party can single-handedly rescue a de-
cision by voting for it.91 This shift in presumption protects the dispute
resolution process from political sabotage and gives panel decisions
much more potency.
A fourth change made by the Understanding is the imposition of
time limits on the process. Under the GATT, the dispute resolution
system was open-ended and panels often deliberated in numerous ses-
sions during a period of months.92 The Understanding imposes strict
83. Understanding, supra note 16.
84. Compare id. (listing the new WTO procedures in great detail) with GATT,
supra note 14, art. XXIII (providing merely cursory explanation of the GATI
procedures).
85. Understanding, supra note 16, art. 2. The DSB is composed of representatives
from every nation that has signed the treaty or code at issue. Shell, Trade Legalism,
supra note 62, at 848 n.89.
86. Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 62, at 848.
87. Understanding, supra note 16, art. 17.
88. It. art. 17(1)-(2).
89. Id. arts. 16(4), 17(14).
90. See supra text accompanying note 64.
91. Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 62, at 850.
92. Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra note 9, at 396.
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time limits on the disputants,93 the panel,94 the Appellate Body,95 and
the DSB96 at every stage of the proceedings and encourages those in-
volved to discharge their duties promptly.97
Under the GAIT system, delays were often attributable to dis-
agreements in the formation of the panel. The consensus requirement
"delayed the establishment [of the panel] while the parties engaged in
meaningless semantic struggles over whether anyone had a right to
the establishment of a panel and the precise remit of the panel."98
The Understanding reverses the power balance by requiring consen-
sus to delay the formation of a panel once the complaining nation has
requested one.9 Thus, under the WTO system, panel formation is
virtually automatic and yet another delay tactic is thereby eliminated.
Fifth, the Understanding gives teeth to the dispute resolution sys-
tem by empowering the WTO to impose sanctions on nations that re-
fuse to comply with adopted decisions. 100 Under the GATT, the most
that the Contracting Parties could do was authorize the aggrieved na-
tion to retaliate against the violator nation.' 0' A nation with sufficient
political and economic power could easily ignore this retaliation and
continue the prohibited practices.102 The Understanding provides for
ongoing surveillance of the transgressor's trade practices to ensure
that they comply with the decision.' 0 3
Finally, the drafters of the Understanding addressed the vexing
problem of unilateral retaliatory action. Article 23, entitled
"Strengthening of the Multilateral System," prohibits all members
from "mak[ing] a determination to the effect that a violation has oc-
curred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attain-
ment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded,
except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the
rules and procedures of this Understanding.""'' This prohibition so-
lidifies the authoritative and exclusive position of the VTO in trade
dispute resolution. 05
93. Understanding, supra note 16, arts. 12(5)-(6), 15(l)-(3).
94. 1d. arts. 12(3), 12(8)-(9), 21(5).
95. Id art. 17(5).
96. Id arts. 20, 21(4).
97. See id. art. 4(9) (encouraging parties to accelerate proceedings in cases of
urgency).
98. Young, supra note 64, at 402.
99. Understanding, supra note 16, art. 6(1).
100. Id. art. 22; see also Young, supra note 64, at 404-05 (noting that under the
WTO system, "the offending party is eventually told in no uncertain terms that it is to
accept all [the WTO's] rulings and decisions").
101. GAIT, supra note 14, art. XXIII(2); see supra text accompanying note 65.
102. This is essentially what happened in the United States-Netherlands dispute of
1953. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
103. Understanding, supra note 16, art. 21; Young, supra note 64, at 404.
104. Understanding, supra note 16, art. 23(2)(a).
105. See Young, supra note 64, at 400-01.
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Viewed together, these changes reflect the desire of the WTO mem-
ber nations to depoliticize trade dispute resolution and encourage
greater predictability and fairness in the application of trade
agreements.
II. TI ROLE OF PRIVATE PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO DisPuTE
RESOLUTION SYSTEM
The role that private parties should play in international dispute
resolution has been the subject of debate among commentators for
many years. This part summarizes the philosophical debate over the
nature of dispute resolution and argues that the history of dispute res-
olution under the GATT and the WTO shows a trend toward greater
reliance on consistent application of trade agreements and less reli-
ance on the relative power of the disputants. This part concludes that
this emphasis on rule integrity is a desirable one, and that greater pri-
vate participation in the WTO dispute resolution process is necessary
to advance this trend.
A. Pragmatism vs. Legalism: The Philosophical Debate over the
Nature of International Trade Dispute Resolution
Since the inception of the GATT, there has been a debate over the
appropriate nature of international trade regulation and dispute reso-
lution. Although commentators have expressed a wide spectrum of
views on this issue, a general distinction can be made between those
who prefer a "power-oriented" or "pragmatist" approach and those
who prefer a "rule-oriented" or 'legalist" approach. 0 6
Pragmatists believe that the goal of international trade dispute reso-
lution should be merely to provide a forum for nations to resolve dis-
putes among themselves in whichever way they see fit.' 0 7 The primary
purpose of the dispute resolution system, they argue, should be to end
the dispute as soon as possible by encouraging negotiations, consulta-
tions, and appropriate political compromises. 10 8 Under this view, the
system would encourage compromises even if they are in contraven-
tion of the rules and agreements governing the trade practices in
question.1°9
106. The concepts of power-oriented and rule-oriented diplomacy were first devel-
oped by Professor Jackson. See John H. Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of the
Liberal Trade System, 12 J. World Trade L. 93, 98 (1978) [hereinafter Jackson, Crum-
bling Institutions]. The terms "pragmatist" and "legalist" were first used in this con-
text by Professor Trimble, see Trimble, supra note 39, at 1017, and later by numerous
commentators, e.g., MontaflA i Mora, supra note 25, at 109; Shell, Trade Legalism,
supra note 62, at 833.
107. Trimble, supra note 39, at 1017; Young, supra note 64, at 390.
108. Olivier Long, Law and Its Limitations in the GATT Multilateral Trade System
71 (1985); Trimble, supra note 39, at 1017; Young, supra note 64, at 390.
109. See MontaftA i Mora, supra note 25, at 110-11; Trimble, supra note 39, at 1017.
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A necessary corollary to the pragmatist view is the idea that trade-
related diplomacy should be power-oriented rather than rule-ori-
ented.110 In power-oriented diplomacy, it is the relative power of the
parties that determines the resolution of the dispute and not any pre-
determined set of rules."' Under this system, "[a] small country
would hesitate to challenge a large one on whom its trade depends.
Implicit or explicit threats... would be a major part of the technique
employed."" 2
The legalists, on the other hand, take the view that the goal of trade
dispute resolution should be to preserve the integrity of the applicable
rules." 3 The benefit seen in this approach is that it encourages pre-
dictability and stability in international trade practices. 14 Private par-
ties and governments, it is argued, could more adequately "plan
economic decisions and thereby maximize efficiency" if trade condi-
tions are predictable."15
The legalist view dovetails with a rule-oriented approach to diplo-
macy."16 In a rule-oriented system, the resolution of a dispute would
be based on adherence to a prescribed set of rules to which the parties
have already agreed." 7 Any disagreements that arise concerning the
application of the rules are resolved by an impartial third party or by
some other unbiased, predetermined process." 8 In contrast to the
power-oriented approach, the rule-oriented approach gives no signifi-
cance to the relative power of the disputants.1 9
B. The Historical Trend Toward Legalism
The evolution of world trade dispute resolution in this century rep-
resents a shift from power-oriented diplomacy (i.e., pragmatism) to
rule-oriented diplomacy (i.e., legalism).' The two major leaps for-
ward in this movement have been the Bretton Woods Conference, in-
110. Montafif i Mora, supra note 25, at 109.
111. Jackson, Crumbling Institutions, supra note 106, at 98-99.
112. John H. Jackson, Governmental Disputes in International Trade Relations: A
Proposal in the Context of GATT, 13 J. World Trade L 1, 3-4 (1979) [hereinafter
Jackson, Governmental Disputes].
113. See Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 21, at 93; Jackson, Crumbling
Institutions, supra note 106, at 99.
114. Montafit i Mora, supra note 25, at 129; Trimble, supra note 39, at 1017-18;
Young, supra note 64, at 390.
115. Trimble, supra note 39, at 1017.
116. Montafikt i Mora, supra note 25, at 109.
117. Jackson, Crumbling Institutions, supra note 106, at 99.
118. Jackson, Governmental Disputes, supra note 112, at 4.
119. See Jackson, Crumbling Institutions, supra note 106, at 98-99.
120. Professor Jackson argues more broadly that the entire "history of civilization
may be described as a gradual evolution from a power oriented approach, in the state
of nature, towards a rule oriented approach" and that "modem western democracies
... have passed far along the scale towards a rule oriented approach." Id. at 99.
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cluding the subsequent development of the GATT, and the recent
creation of the WTO.
The nations participating in the Bretton Woods Conference and the
drafters of the GATT were trying to create a reliable, integral set of
rules that would govern world trade.12 ' Had the ITO gotten off the
ground, it would have contained an elaborate dispute resolution sys-
tem unlike any that had come before."z Because the GATT was in-
tended merely as a preliminary agreement to regulate world trade
until the ITO took over, it did not contain detailed dispute resolution
provisions.'2 In the early years of the GATT, however, the Con-
tracting Parties developed procedures, such as the practice of ap-
pointing an impartial panel to review the dispute and make a
recommendation, that reflected an acceptance of a rule-oriented, le-
galistic approach. 24
The following decades, however, were marked by a breakdown of
the dispute resolution system and a retreat into power-based diplo-
macy.'1 5 The "birth defects" of the GATT began to manifest them-
selves as political influences crept into and distorted the dispute
resolution process.' 26 This politicization of the system undermined
the integrity of the GATT rules and made the power of the parties a
primary factor in the outcome of trade disputes. 27
One major goal of the Uruguay Round was to improve the increas-
ingly ineffectual dispute resolution system by inhibiting the parties'
ability to use their political and economic power to circumvent the
rules.1' The new dispute resolution system under the WTO repre-
sents a major shift toward a legalist approach and away from the
power-based pragmatism that pervaded the GATT system.12 9
For example, the creation of the DSB to oversee all disputes ac-
cords with the legalist idea of an impartial final arbiter. The addition
of an appellate procedure shows that the member nations were put-
ting more emphasis on the adequacy and quality of rule interpretation
121. See Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 21, at 93 (quoting Harry Haw-
kins, one of the GATI drafters, as stating that the GATT "should deal with these
subjects in precise detail so that the obligations of member governments would be
clear and unambiguous").
122. ld.; Young, supra note 64, at 392-93.
123. Young, supra note 64, at 391-92; see supra text accompanying note 53.
124. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 21, at 93; MontafhA i Mora, supra
note 25, at 118-19; Young, supra note 64, at 393-94.
125. See Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 21, at 93; Montaflh i Mora,
supra note 25, at 111, 119-20; Young, supra note 64, at 394.
126. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 21, at 93; Montafil i Mora, supra
note 25, at 111, 119-20; Young, supra note 64, at 394; see supra text accompanying
notes 68-74.
127. MontaflA i Mora, supra note 25, at 108-09.
128. Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 62, at 845.
129. Id. at 833; Young, supra note 64, at 391, 399, 406; see also Montaf1i i Mora,
supra note 25, at 137 (describing the 1989 Uruguay Round developments as being the
"first step towards a legalistic reform").
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and less on the swift resolution of the dispute in whichever way possi-
ble. This focus on rule integrity illustrates the member nations' strong
legalist view. The provision of strict time limits, the automatic adop-
tion of panel decisions, the prohibition of unilateral action, and the
heightened enforcement measures limit the ability of large nations to
use their power to delay, derail, or circumvent the dispute resolution
system. Taken together, these changes make the WTO dispute resolu-
tion system look much more like a courtroom than like a negotiating
table.
C. The Advantages of a Legalistic Approach
This increasing emphasis on rule integrity in international trade dis-
pute resolution is a desirable trend that should continue in the future.
Perhaps the primary benefit of such an approach is that it makes
global trade practices more predictable and therefore encourages in-
ternational investment and trade. 3 ' One of the stated goals of the
WTO dispute resolution system is to "provid[e] security and predict-
ability to the multilateral trading system."'13' A power-oriented sys-
tem, by definition, produces different outcomes based on the power
balance of the disputants at that point in history,132 as the current
Helms-Burton debate illustrates. The resulting uncertainty would
make private parties justifiably hesitant to invest their capital and ef-
fort into international trade.
The pragmatists' emphasis on merely resolving each dispute as ex-
peditiously as possible133 is too shortsighted and would actually lead
to more international disputes. A reliance on the power of the respec-
tive nations encourages large nations to use their economic and polit-
ical might to reap benefits in contravention of the rules. Such a
system would encourage, maybe even ensure, future disputes. 34 A
rule-oriented approach, on the other hand, encourages adherence to
the rules, giving strong nations no incentive to try to circumvent
them. 3
5
130. See MontaflA i Mora, supra note 25, at 178.
131. Understanding, supra note 16, art. 3(2); see also Renato Ruggiero, Director-
General of the WTO, Welcome to the WTO's Web Server (last modified Sept. 20, 1996)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/rugg2_wpf.html> (on file with the Fordham Law Review)
[hereinafter Ruggiero, WTO Welcome] (noting that access to markets must be "both
predictable and secure").
132. Young, supra note 64, at 390, 401.
133. See Long, supra note 108, at 71.
134. See Sanger, supra note 1, at Al (noting that the United States' attempt to
resolve this dispute by invoking a "national security exemption" will probably lead to
future disputes over the use of such an exemption by other nations).
135. See Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 21, at 112 ("[I]t is not the reso-
lution of the specific dispute under consideration which is most important. Rather, it
is the efficient and just future functioning of the overall system which is the primary
goal of a dispute-settlement procedure.").
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A further benefit of a rule-oriented approach is that it will foster
more amicable international relations. A system that relies on a na-
tion's power encourages a nation to exercise its power, or at least "flex
[its] muscles which can get out of hand."' 36 The international acri-
mony that resulted from the United States' use of unilateral actions in
the decades preceding the WTO 37 illustrates the deleterious effects
that a power-oriented system can have, as does the current rancor sur-
rounding the United States' efforts to disrupt the WTO's considera-
tion of the Helms-Burton Act.
Indeed, the trend toward rule-oriented diplomacy, both in interna-
tional trade and in other contexts, may be an inevitable result of the
global rise of democracy. As national power shifts from entrenched
governmental decision-makers to private citizens, the power of na-
tions is increasingly fragmented among competing domestic constitu-
encies.138 With a nation's power thus decentralized, it can less
successfully be used as the primary bargaining chip in international
relations. Therefore, a power-oriented approach "becomes more dif-
ficult if not impossible.' 139
Of course, the trend toward legalism is not without its critics. One
concern is that a strong, rule-based international trade regime will
limit nations' ability to structure their own domestic laws. Professor
Philip M. Nichols argues that the domestic laws of every nation reflect
the political and societal values of that nation, and that imposing a
superseding international law undermines these values in the name of
free trade.140
This argument overlooks the role that each nation's domestic
processes played in determining whether that nation would enter into
the WTO. The result of the Uruguay Round was merely the Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization.' 4' To obtain the
benefits afforded by WTO membership, and the corresponding re-
straints, nations needed to approve the Charter through their domes-
tic ratification processes.'4a The political and societal values that
136. Jackson, Crumbling Institutions, supra note 106, at 100.
137. Jackson, Uruguay Round, supra note 10, at 25; Shell, Trade Legalism, supra
note 62, at 844-45.
138. See Jackson, Crumbling Institutions, supra note 106, at 100 (describing how the
growth of democracy "restrict[s] the degree of power and discretion which the Execu-
tive possesses").
139. Il at 101.
140. Nichols, Extension of Standing, supra note 12, at 299. Professor Nichols rec-
ommends that the WTO adopt an exception under which "laws primarily codifying an
underlying societal value and only incidentally hindering free trade should not be
subject to World Trade Organization scrutiny." Id. at 301.
141. WTO Charter, supra note 9.
142. See id. arts. XI, XII, XIII & XIV (referring to the need for member nations to
"accept" or "accede to" the agreement). The United States legislation implementing
the WTO Charter is the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3624
(1994).
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Professor Nichols wants to protect already came into play when each
nation decided to join the WTO. Furthermore, the VTO Charter was
drafted by governmental representatives who presumably tried to in-
fuse their respective national values into the Charter and the trade
agreements that accompanied it.
Professor Nichols also sees the "rigidity of the [WTO] dispute reso-
lution process" as presenting "a special danger," in that "[c]ountries
asked to choose between obedience to the World Trade Organization
and having empirically legitimate [domestic] laws may choose to ig-
nore the World Trade Organization."'14 3 This possibility is belied by
the eagerness with which nations joined the VITO. According to the
WTO Homepage on the World Wide Web, "[o]ut of a potential mem-
bership of 152 countries and territories, 76 governments became mem-
bers of the VTO on its first day, with some 50 other governments at
various stages of completing their domestic ratification proce-
dures.""' This enthusiastic response shows that these nations readily
accepted the limitations that the WTO would put on their domestic
processes in order to obtain the benefits of a stable, predictable sys-
tem of free trade. 45
D. The Benefits of Private Participation
The movement toward legalism in international trade dispute reso-
lution has been based on separating political influences and motives
from the dispute resolution system.' 46 As discussed above, a primary
benefit of such an approach is that it allows private parties to more
accurately predict future trade conditions, thus allowing them to maxi-
mize the value of their resources by participating in international
trade.' 47 If we want to encourage private parties to engage in interna-
tional trade, we need to allow them to participate in the dispute reso-
lution system in a manner that will enable them to sufficiently protect
their interests.
The agreements and procedures of the WTO have a major impact
on the daily operations of the business community.148 Like any organ-
ization, the WTO's continued validity and relevance is dependent on
143. Nichols, Extension of Standing, supra note 12, at 300.
144. The Foundations of the World Trading System (last modified Sept. 8, 1995)
<http-//www.wto.org/wto/2 l0_wpf.html> (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
145. Professor Nichols himself acknowledges the tremendous financial benefit re-
sulting from the free trade provisions of the agreements accompanying the VTO's
creation. He cites an International Monetary Fund report estimating that the WTO
tariff reductions "should increase the value of the world economy by between 212
billion and 500 billion dollars." Nichols, Extension of Standing, supra note 12, at 296.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 120-29.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 130-35.
148. See Ruggiero, WTO Welcome, supra note 131 (noting that "[t]he WTO is very
young, yet its potential impact on the lives of businessmen, inventors, consumers,
farmers, scientists, creative artists and workers in all endeavours, is already evident"):
see also MontafiA i Mora, supra note 25, at 162 (describing the profound impact that
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the support of those it is intended to benefit-in this case, private par-
ties.'49 If private parties are denied sufficient access to the dispute
resolution system, then the WTO will lose its legitimacy as the final
arbiter of international trade and its decisions will be rendered
impotent.150
Private participation also improves the quality of the WTO's inter-
pretation of the rules. Private parties will raise claims and make argu-
ments that governments might deem politically unwise to propound
on their own initiative. 5' Limiting private participation, on the other
hand, silences private parties "insofar as they might contribute to
wiser, more contextual decision-making."' 52
A further benefit of private participation is that it "tend[s] to deem-
phasize and depoliticize many relatively minor trade or economic
complaints that now exist between nations.'1 53 For example, if the
United States is in delicate trade negotiations with Japan, the United
States might be hesitant to raise a claim against Japanese import re-
strictions on, say, cars, or even to express a negative view of these
restrictions. If Ford or General Motors can be the instigator or pri-
mary proponent of the claim, the problem will be addressed without
the United States having to take the political heat. Certainly, the
political complications arising from the Helms-Burton Act would not
be so severe or troubling if the claim was raised by a private party
instead of another government.
Professor Nichols argues that the enhanced publicity that would ac-
company greater private participation would actually harm the cause
of free trade because constituencies who oppose free trade will be
more vocal in advancing their protectionist ideologies. 4 He predicts
that "[t]he resulting loss of its low profile might prove disastrous for
international treaties in general, and GAIT specifically, have on individuals and
businesses).
149. See Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the
World Trade Organization, 17 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 331, 331, 351 (1996) (arguing
that "a closed dispute resolution process will undermine popular support"); Ruggiero,
WTO Welcome, supra note 131 ("As the world's most recent, and most far-reaching,
initiative in multilateral economic cooperation, the World Trade Organization has a
need to be well understood by a wide public ....").
150. See Young, supra note 64, at 408 ("lP]eople are more likely to accept adverse
political decisions if those decisions are made by political institutions they consider
legitimate.").
151. See Charnovitz, supra note 149, at 353; Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 62, at
901.
152. Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 62, at 908; accord Charnovitz, supra note
149, at 351.
153. John H. Jackson et al., Implementing the Tokyo Round: National Constitu-
tions and International Economic Rules 209 (1984) [hereinafter Jackson, Tokyo
Round]; accord MontafiA i Mora, supra note 25, at 161; cf. Young, supra note 64, at
408 (discussing how the depoliticization of dispute resolution can "give an offending
country some political cover to make necessary changes").
154. Nichols, Extension of Standing, supra note 12, at 315.
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free trade. ' 155 As support for this notion, he cites the "rancorous de-
bates" within the United States surrounding the ratification of the
WTO Charter and the North American Free Trade Agreement
(,NAFTA"). 156
This somewhat paternalistic view seems to be based on the supposi-
tion that the enormous benefits of free trade will not be understood
by the public at large. The business community, however, has a tre-
mendous interest in free trade and will most likely be a significant
voice in the public debate."s Professor Nichols' reliance on the U.S.
debate surrounding the WTO and NAFTA seems to be misplaced,
considering that the protectionists lost each of those battles. In fact,
the more logical conclusion to draw from the WTO and NAFTA de-
bates is that public airings of free trade issues tend to come out in
favor of trade liberalization, not in favor of protectionism.
Professor Nichols is also concerned that "[a]llowing private parties
that were not successful when values and goals were balanced at the
national level to [participate in dispute resolution] would create an
irreconcilable dissonance for countries engaged in the delicate process
of trade negotiation."' 5 He fears that giving weight to the views of
private parties would "create uncertainty about a country's true
position."'159
The premise of this point seems to be misguided. If a party's values
were not advanced by its government at the time the relevant trade
agreement was being negotiated, then these values would not have
been incorporated into the trade agreements. Therefore, the party
would not have a WTO claim for violation of this agreement.
In any event, trade negotiations will not be harmed just because
constituents of the participating nations may have tried to enforce
prior agreements. As discussed above, allowing private parties to par-
ticipate more broadly actually takes some political heat off of govern-
ments and will lead to more amicable trade relations."6 In addition,
trade negotiations will be more meaningful if the parties know that
the resulting agreements will be predictably and fairly enforced.
Finally, Professor Nichols' concern that giving private parties more
of a voice would engender confusion over the true position of a nation
seems unrealistic. As Professor G. Richard Shell observes, "[t]his ar-
155. Id.
156. Id. at 315-16; North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-
Mex.-U.S., 32 I.LM. 605 [hereinafter NAFTA].
157. Shell, Trade Stakeholders Model, supra note 19, at 376; see also Australia:
ABB Chief Wants Complaints Procedures at WTO, Bangkok Post, Dec. 8, 1994, avail-
able in LEXIS, World Library, TXPRIM File (describing the call by David de Pury,
co-chairman of ABB Asean Brown Bovery, for the WTO to allow companies to lodge
complaints with the dispute resolution system).
158. Nichols, Extension of Standing, supra note 12, at 318.
159. Id.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 136-37.
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gument gives trade bureaucrats too little credit.' 161 Surely WTO
panel members will be able to tell whether the position they are hear-
ing is coming from a government official or a private party.162 The
presentation of a wider variety of opinions should not be viewed with
alarm, but should be embraced as a means of improving the quality of
panel decisions.' 63
III. THE INADEQUACY OF ANY LEVEL OF PRIVATE
PARTICIPATION SHORT OF PRIVATE STANDING
Once we have accepted the idea that private participation in the
dispute resolution system is a desirable goal, we need to determine the
appropriate level of participation. There are many ways that private
parties can be given the power to influence the dispute resolution sys-
tem. The most direct method is to grant private parties standing to
raise claims before the WTO, but if a lower standard would ade-
quately allow private parties to protect their interests, then we should
adopt this lower standard. An analysis will show, however, that any
level of private participation in the dispute resolution system short of
standing is either inadequate, unfeasible, or both.
A. Private Parties' Use of Their Domestic Influence
Currently, private parties who want to challenge a trade practice of
another nation must try to use their domestic influence to get their
government to raise the claim. The private party can try to activate its
government through informal means such as voting or lobbying. In
addition, some governments, such as the United States and the Euro-
pean Community, have instituted formal procedures by which citizens
can petition the government to respond to another nation's trade
violation.
1. Informal Methods
Some commentators argue that private standing before the WTO is
unnecessary because most countries that are important to interna-
tional trade are representative nations which will be responsive to the
needs of their citizens. 164 Professor Nichols writes that "democratic
governments do function to fairly assess, evaluate, and coordinate var-
ious societal values and goals" and that "[t]his is true of trade policy as
well."'165
161. Shell, Trade Stakeholders Model, supra note 19, at 374.
162. Id at 374-75.
163. See Charnovitz, supra note 149, at 342 ("[O]ne need not posit a failure in de-
mocracy to support greater [private] participation in international organizations. To
the contrary, [private] participation should be viewed as an exemplification of the
democratic vision.").
164. Trimble, supra note 39, at 1025.
165. Nichols, Extension of Standing, supra note 12, at 311-12.
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We must make a distinction, however, between the formation of
trade policy and the effective implementation of policy once it is
formed. With respect to the former, Professor Nichols is correct in
stressing the essential role a government plays in balancing competing
societal, political, and economic values. Dispute resolution, however,
involves the latter, and a consideration of competing values, as op-
posed to an emphasis on the rules, would undermine the predictability
that the WTO seeks to achieve.
There are many reasons why a nation might neglect to raise a valid
claim on behalf of a constituent. For example, as one commentator
notes, a nation "might not want to repeat [a private party's] point if
doing so could undermine the government in another WTO case or in
domestic litigation."'166 In addition, every nation has constituents with
varying interests, and the government cannot possibly represent all of
their interests, no matter how well-intentioned and responsive it is. 67
In addition, a nation's responsiveness to its constituents will be bal-
anced against its desire to maintain amicable relations with its trading
partners, especially those with significant political and economic
power.16 For this reason a nation will inevitably bring fewer claims
than some of its constituents would like. This political, power-ori-
ented influence on the dispute resolution system subverts the WTO's
goals of predictability and stability in world trade.
2. Formal Methods
Some nations have instituted formal procedures by which a private
party can petition the government to take action in response to the
alleged trade infractions of another nation. The most influential of
these procedures is the United States' section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974 ("Section 301"). 119 Partially as a response to the perceived
overuse of Section 301, the European Community enacted an analo-
gous procedure-Council Regulation 2641/84 on the Strengthening of
the Common Commercial Policy ("Regulation 2641/84")."70 These
procedures could conceivably be used to expand private participation
166. Charnovitz, supra note 149, at 353.
167. Cf id at 342 (noting that "many national governments fail to represent the
interests of even a majority of their constituencies as periodically reflected by low
approval ratings.")
168. See Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 62, at 901. Professor Shell also notes the
"free rider problems" that arise in this context. He observes that the benefits of elim-
inating a prohibited trade practice accrue to all nations, while the diplomatic fallout is
confined to the nation that brings the claim. Therefore, nations will be hesitant to
raise a claim, even where doing so would be a net benefit to world trade as a whole.
Id. at 901-02.
169. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420 (1994).
170. Council Regulation 2641/84 of 17 September 1984 on the Strengthening of the
Common Commercial Policy with Regard in Particular to Protection Against Illicit
Commercial Practices, 1984 OJ. (L 252) 1 [hereinafter Regulation 2641/84].
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in the dispute resolution system, and thus need to be examined in
closer detail to evaluate their adequacy and feasibility.
a. Section 301
Under Section 301, a citizen may petition the U.S. Trade Represen-
tative to take action against a foreign nation's trade practices. 171 Af-
ter an investigation, the Trade Representative will decide whether the
trade practice in question is violating any trade agreement and, if so,
what measures should be taken. 2 When the United States has retali-
ated, it has usually been in the form of heightened tariffs or other
restrictions on imports.173
Section 301 is clearly a power-oriented device, and it has produced
all of the negative effects that are associated with the use of power-
oriented negotiation tactics. While Section 301 actions have been
highly successful in the past, they have soured relations between the
United States and its trading partners and have even inspired retalia-
tion against the United States.'7 4 The animosity towards the United
States that unilateral measures can produce cautions against contin-
ued use of Section 301 to resolve trade disputes. Section 301 does, in
an individual case, give private parties some measure of control and
input into world trade. This access, however, comes at too high a cost.
The continued use of Section 301 would be a reversion to the power-
oriented diplomacy of the past and would undermine the U.S.-sup-
ported efforts of the WTO to make the system fairer and more
predictable."'
In addition to being unwise, continued use of Section 301 is also
unlikely. The United States government's liberal use of Section 301
actions in the past few decades was primarily a reaction to the ineffi-
cacy of the GATT dispute resolution system.176 Now that the system
has been improved under the WTO, the United States is not as likely
to find it necessary to resort to unilateral action under Section 301.177
171. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1).
172. Id §§ 2411-2420; A. Lynne Puckett & William L. Reynolds, Rules, Sanctions
and Enforcement Under Section 301: At Odds with the WTO?, 90 Am. J. Int'l L. 675,
678-79 (1996).
173. Richard 0. Cunningham & Clint N. Smith, Section 301 and Dispute Settlement
in the World Trade Organization, in The World Trade Organization: The Multilateral
Trade Framework for the 21st Century and U.S. Implementing Legislation, supra note
10, at 581, 583.
174. Jackson, Uruguay Round, supra note 10, at 25; Shell, Trade Legalism, supra
note 62, at 844-45.
175. See Puckett & Reynolds, supra note 172, at 688-89; Shell, Trade Legalism,
supra note 62, at 899.
176. Puckett & Reynolds, supra note 172, at 687; Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note
62, at 843-44.
177. Puckett & Reynolds, supra note 172, at 689; Terence P. Stewart, The Uruguay
Round Agreements Act An Overview of Major Issues and Potential Trouble Spots, in
The World Trade Organization: The Multilateral Trade Framework for the 21st Cen-
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Another reason that Section 301 is an inadequate method for pri-
vate parties to protect their rights is that there is no guarantee that the
Trade Representative will take action, even if the complaint is valid.
The government retains broad discretion at every step of a Section
301 procedure."' 8 The same political motivations that could prevent a
government from raising the claims of its constituents 79 could dis-
courage the United States from actively pursuing a Section 301
petition.
The strongest argument against the use of Section 301, however, is
that it almost certainly would be in violation of the Understanding.
Article 23(2) of the Understanding forbids nations from taking unilat-
eral action, and even from "mak[ing] a determination to the effect
that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or im-
paired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agree-
ments has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute
settlement.'n s0 It is hard to envision any explanation for the use of
Section 301 that does not come into conflict with this prohibition.
The Understanding's repudiation of unilateral measures is in con-
ffict, however, with the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (the
"URAA"), the U.S. statute adopting the WTO Charter. The
URAA specifically states that Congress did not intend the WTO
Charter to invalidate Section 301.18 It is difficult to reconcile this
provision of the URAA with Article 23. Such discrepancies between
domestic laws and the Understanding are covered by Article 16(4) of
the WTO Charter, which requires each member to "ensure the con-
formity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its
obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements."' 3 Based on this
provision, it is likely that any continued use of Section 301 will be a
violation of U.S. obligations under the WTO Charter. s'4
Some commentators argue that the WTO agreements will actually
enhance the usefulness of Section 301 by increasing the number of
trade restrictions that it can be used to combat.18s The short-term ef-
fectiveness of Section 301, however, is not in dispute. It is clear that
Section 301 has successfully protected U.S. interests in the past and,
given the power and influence of the United States, it is likely that the
tury and U.S. Implementing Legislation, supra note 10, at 29, 33 (Terence P. Stewart
ed., 1996) [hereinafter Stewart, Trouble Spots].
178. Cunningham & Smith, supra note 173, at 603-04; see Jared tR Silverman, Mul-
tilateral Resolution over Unilateral Retaliation: Adjudicating the Use of Section 301
Before the WTO, 17 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 233, 246 n.61 (1996).
179. See supra text accompanying notes 164-68.
180. Understanding, supra note 16, art. 23(2)(a); see Stewart, Trouble Spots, supra
note 177, at 33-34.
181. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3624 (1994).
182. See id. § 3512(a)(2)(B); Cunningham & Smith, supra note 173, at 591.
183. WTO Charter, supra note 9, art. XVI(4).
184. See Stewart, Trouble Spots, supra note 177, at 33-34.
185. Cunningham & Smith, supra note 173, at 592.
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United States would get away with continued use of Section 301 in the
future. This, however, does not mean that continuing to take unilat-
eral actions against its trading partners in circumvention of the WTO
is a wise course of action for the United States. On the contrary, Sec-
tion 301 threatens the continued validity and relevance of the WTO
dispute resolution system which the United States has worked so hard
to improve.
b. Regulation 2641/84
In 1984, the European Community adopted Regulation 2641/84
which gives private parties the right to petition the EC Commission to
investigate harmful foreign trade practices. A private party has stand-
ing to raise a complaint if it is "acting on behalf of a Community in-
dustry" that has been injured by an illicit trade practice of another
nation.'86 The Commission will initiate an investigation of the offend-
ing trade practice if it deems it "necessary in the interest of the Com-
munity.' 1 87 An investigation can entail consultations with the nation
in question, 188 public hearings, 189 and the submission of briefs.190 The
Commission can recommend retaliatory action if it determines that
such action is necessary and is not prohibited by international law. 19'
Regulation 2641/84 has been rarely used since its adoption, 19 and
will most likely be used even more sparingly now that the WTO dis-
pute resolution system has been improved. Europe's adoption of
Regulation 2641/84 was largely a response to the United States' use of
Section 301,19 and the expected decrease in Section 301 actions will
surely result in even less use of Regulation 2641/84.
In addition, Regulation 2641/84, by its own terms, does not allow
the EC to undertake unilateral measures until the international dis-
pute resolution procedures have been exhausted. 194 This express sub-
ordination of the Regulation to dispute resolution indicates that it will
become increasingly antiquated now that the dispute resolution sys-
tem has been improved.
186. Regulation 2641/84, supra note 170, art. 3(1), at 2; see Wolfgang W. Leirer,
Retaliatory Action in United States and European Union Trade Law: A Comparison of
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Council Regulation 2641/84, 20 N.C. J. Int'l L.
& Com. Reg. 41, 70 (1994).
187. Regulation 2641/84, supra note 170, art. 6(1), at 3.
188. Id. art. 6(1)(b), at 3.
189. See id. art. 6(1)(a), at 3.
190. See Leirer, supra note 186, at 78.
191. Regulation 2641/84, supra note 170, art. 10, at 5; Leirer, supra note 186, at 81.
Although Regulation 2641/84 does not define "international law," GATT 1994 would
certainly qualify. Leirer, supra note 186, at 83.
192. Montafi i Mora, supra note 25, at 133.
193. See Leirer, supra note 186, at 69; Silverman, supra note 178, at 251-52.
194. Regulation 2641/84, supra note 170, art. 10(2), at 5; Montafih i Mora, supra
note 25, at 135; Daniel G. Partan, Retaliation in United States and European Commu-
nity Trade Law, 8 B.U. Int'l L. 333, 341 (1990).
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Moreover, as with Section 301, it is likely that continued use of Reg-
ulation 2641/84 would violate Article 23 of the Understanding, which
prohibits unilateral retaliation.'95 In any event, even if Regulation
2641/84 were to be used more broadly, it would continue to be suscep-
tible to political influences and motives and would therefore under-
mine the goals of security and predictability that private parties desire.
B. Use of Domestic Courts
Another potential avenue that private parties can use to protect
their interest in free trade is their domestic courts. If domestic courts
had the power to make effective determinations about the trade prac-
tices of foreign nations, then private parties would have a potent
mechanism for ensuring global compliance with international trade
agreements. Upon closer inspection, however, the use of domestic
courts in the international arena entails more disadvantages than ad-
vantages and would actually be detrimental to the interests of private
parties.
First, there are practical obstacles to invoking the power of domes-
tic courts to adjudicate international disputes. Courts are extremely
hesitant to extend jurisdiction over the field of international relations.
United States courts, for example, pay a great deal of deference to the
executive and legislative branches in this area and rarely invalidate
foreign-related actions of Congress or the President.' 96 As for the Eu-
ropean Community, "the case-law of the [European Court of Justice
(the "ECJ")] is in a state of profound and seemingly hopeless confu-
sion as far as the problem of the direct applicability of treaties is con-
cerned." 1 7 In most cases, the ECJ has held that individuals may not
bring international trade-related issues before the Court. 98 In cases
where the ECJ has heard such claims, jurisdiction has been based on
195. Understanding, supra note 16, art. 23; see supra text accompanying notes 180-
84.
196. See, e.g, Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292, 309-10 (1981) (upholding Congress's
delegation of power to the President to revoke the plaintiffs passport and noting that
"[m]atters intimately related to foreign policy and national security are rarely proper
subjects for judicial intervention"); Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S.
Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111, 114 (1948) (holding that certain Presidential determinations
regarding foreign air transportation are not subject to judicial review because "execu-
tive decisions as to foreign policy ... are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary
has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility"); United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 329 (1936) (upholding Congress's delegation of power to
the President in the area of foreign policy).
197. Pierre Pescatore, Treaty-Making by the European Communities, in 7 United
Kingdom National Committee of Comparative Law, The Effect of Treaties in Domes-
tic Law 171, 184 (Francis G. Jacobs & Shelley Roberts eds., 1987).
198. See Montafi i Mora, supra note 25, at 170-71; see eg., Joined Cases 21 to 24/
72, International Fruit Co. v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit, 1972 E.C.R. 1219,
1228.
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EC regulations such as Regulation 2641/84.199 As discussed above,
the future use of this regulation is in question.2z°
The ability of courts to adjudicate claims against foreign nations is
also problematic. In the United States, there are both statutory and
judicial limitations on suits against foreign nations. The Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act of 1976 (the "FSIA")201 expressly strips U.S.
courts of jurisdiction over suits against foreign sovereigns, with limited
exceptions.20 2 Even where the FSIA does not bar jurisdiction, under
the judicially-created act-of-state doctrine courts will "abstain from in-
quiry into the validity of an act by a foreign state within its own
territory. 203
In addition to these numerous practical obstacles, allowing private
parties to raise international trade disputes in domestic courts would
do more harm than good to the predictability of world trade. As dis-
cussed above, one major benefit of the WTO's legalistic approach is
the establishment of a single mechanism for resolving trade dis-
putes.20 4 Allowing each nation's courts to independently interpret
and enforce international trade agreements would frustrate this
benefit.20 5
In other contexts, nations have provided private parties with the
ability to enforce an international agreement by expressly linking the
rights of individuals to the domestic court systems of the participating
nations. The two primary examples of this approach are the NAFTA
antidumping provision206 and the Nordic Convention on the Protec-
tion of the Environment (the "Nordic Convention"). 0 7
When antidumping disputes arise concerning the application of one
party's laws under chapter 19 of NAFTA, private parties can raise a
complaint before a NAFTA panel.2 08 Standing is linked to the domes-
tic laws of the importing nation. Specifically, private parties are guar-
199. See Montafna i Mora, supra note 25, at 173; see, e.g., Case 70/87, F~ddration de
l'industrie de 'huilerie de la CEE (Fediol) v. Commission of the European Communi-
ties, 1989 E.C.R. 1781.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 186-95.
201. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1994).
202. Id.; see Troland S. Link, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, Expropriation, Act of
State and Comity, in International Commercial Agreements 1995, at 237, 242 (PLI
Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 726, 1995).
203. Link, supra note 202, at 259.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
205. See Long, supra note 108, at 27; Montaflk i Mora, supra note 25, at 175.
206. NAFTA, supra note 156, arts. 1901-1911, at 682-87.
207. Nordic Convention on the Protection of the Environment, Feb. 19, 1974, Den.-
F'm.-Nor.-Swed., 1092 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter Nordic Convention).
208. NAFrA, supra note 156, art. 1904(5), at 683; see Samuel C. Straight, GATT
and NAFTA: Marrying Effective Dispute Settlement and the Sovereignty of the Fifty
States, 45 Duke LJ. 216, 232 (1995). This applies only to antidumping disputes. In all
other areas, only countries can initiate the dispute settlement process. NAFrA, supra
note 156, art. 2004, at 694.
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anteed the same right that theypossess under domestic law to
challenge the prohibited activities.'
Similarly, the Nordic Convention gives "[a]ny person who is af-
fected or may be affected by a nuisance caused by environmentally
harmful activities in another Contracting State" the right to bring suit
in the offending nation's courts. 10 Under this arrangement, there is
no separate international tribunal, but merely an agreement that each
nation will entertain suits from nationals of other countries to the
same extent that they allow suits from their own citizens.
An analogous system for the WTO would be unworkable and unde-
sirable. The above arrangements include only three or four countries
and only apply to a specific area of the law. In such a context, the
danger of inconsistent application of the law, while not totally absent,
is much less significant than it would be in the WTO, which covers
over a hundred different countries21' and regulates a broad spectrum
of trade practices. If a similar mechanism was used for the WTO, the
domestic courts of dozens of nations would be simultaneously inter-
preting and applying WTO agreements. The resulting lack of uni-
formity in the application of trade laws would undermine the ability of
private parties to reliably anticipate future trade practices. One major
improvement of the WTO dispute resolution system over the GATT
was the elimination of multiple forums for resolving disputes. A sys-
tem that ties private-party standing to the domestic laws of each na-
tion would negate this benefit. Moreover, allowing each nation's
domestic law to define the standing requirements for the WTO would
cause private access to be overly susceptible to politically-motivated
limitations-each nation could limit private-party challenges to its
trade practices by limiting domestic judicial review of international
trade decisions.
C. Private Participation in Policy Formation
Several commentators have argued that the WTO should allow pri-
vate parties and organizations to have greater influence in setting the
policies and standards of international trade.1 Such a suggestion is
209. NAFTA, supra note 156, art. 1904(5), at 683; see Straight, supra note 208, at
232.
210. Nordic Convention, supra note 207, art. 3, at 296; see Veit Koester, Nordic
Countries' Legislation on the Environment with Special Emphasis on Conservation:
A Survey 10 (1980); Philippe J. Sands, The Environment, Community and Interna-
tional Law, 30 Harv. Int'l LJ. 393, 413-14 (1989); Christopher D. Stone, Locale and
Legitimacy in International Environmental Law, 48 Stan. L Rev. 1279, 1283 (1996).
211. See The Foundations of the World Trading System (last modified Sept. 8, 1995)
<http'//www.wto.org/wto/2-l0_.wpf.htnl> (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
212. See Charnovitz, supra note 149, at 340-48; Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note
62, at 922 ("[UItimately, individuals and [nongovernmental organizations] will need
to become more deeply involved in the legislative process by which the world trade
community creates rules and standards-not just the adjudicative process by which
these rules are applied.").
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not novel in world trade-in fact, the draft charter for the ITO pro-
vided that "[t]he Organization may make suitable arrangements for
consultation and co-operation with nongovernmental organizations
concerned with matters within the scope of this Charter. 2 13 An iden-
tical provision is included in the WTO Charter.214
To some extent, private participation in the formation of interna-
tional trade policy has already taken place. The countries participat-
ing in the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations made significant
efforts to solicit public comments. 1 5 And on an ongoing basis, the
Policy Dialogue Group-a coalition of academic experts, members of
the business community, and representatives of special interest
groups-meets regularly with WTO officials to discuss current issues
in international trade.21 6
Enhancing the role of private parties in establishing international
trade policy is an admirable goal and the trend toward greater in-
volvement is promising. The input of private parties will surely be
helpful in eliminating policy-based barriers to free trade. But as long
as access to the dispute resolution system is limited to nations, private
parties can never be sure that the policies that they helped develop
will actually be enforced. No matter how advantageous the underly-
ing policies are, political motivations can still prevent nations from
raising valid complaints when these policies are transgressed.
D. Private Parties' Ability to Submit Amicus Briefs
Currently, private parties are not allowed to submit amicus briefs to
WTO dispute resolution panels.21 7 This prohibition has been the sub-
ject of some criticism from commentators 218 and from the United
States.219 Allowing some nongovernmental entities to make written
presentations to WTO panels, it is argued, would lead to better in-
formed, more enlightened panel decisions. 0
Permitting qualified private parties to submit amicus briefs would
certainly improve the WTO dispute resolution system. But the ability
to participate in ongoing disputes between nations, while desirable,
comes too late in the process to adequately protect the interests of
213. ITO Charter, art. 87(2), quoted in Charnovitz, supra note 149, at 338.
214. WTO Charter, supra note 9, art. V(2).
215. Nichols, Extension of Standing, supra note 12, at 305-06.
216. Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 62, at 923-24.
217. See Charnovitz, supra note 149, at 352.
218. See, e.g., id. at 355.
219. Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 62, at 913 n.368.
220. See Charnovitz, supra note 149, at 351 (arguing that private participation will
"increase the information available to the panel, thereby leading to better informed-
and hopefully better quality-panel decisions"); Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 62,
at 908 (arguing that excluding private parties from WTO dispute resolution will
"silenc[e] them insofar as they might contribute to wiser, more contextual decision-
making").
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private parties. Nongovernmental entities that are being harmed by
illicit trade practices will still be denied relief if their governments, for
political reasons, refuse to raise their claims in the first place. The
ability to file amicus briefs, like every other level of private participa-
tion short of standing, provides insufficient protection for private par-
ties engaged in international trade.
IV. MAKING PRIVATE-PARTY STANDING VIABLE
The final argument of those who oppose private standing is that
even if it is desirable, it is not practicable. Professor Nichols maintains
that "it is difficult to envisage a scheme that could equitably allow for
direct participation by all of the citizens of the world."" 1 But the fact
is that private standing has worked elsewhere in the international
context.
The major international forums pointed to by proponents of private
standing before the WTO include:222 the International Center for Set-
tlement of Investment Disputes (the "ICSID");M the International
Labour Organisation (the "ILO");' 4 the European Convention on
Human Rights;-, and the investment provisions of NAFTA. 226 In or-
der to determine the proper threshold for standing before the WTO, it
will be helpful to examine the standards used by these other tribunals.
A. Systems Where Standing Is Limited by the Nature of the Entity
The ICSID and the ILO both provide some nongovernmental enti-
ties standing to initiate disputes. Upon closer inspection, however, the
nature of these entities serve to limit standing in a way that renders
them inapposite to the WTO.
The ICSID was formed in 1965 when the World Bank's Executive
Directors adopted the ICSID Convention.227 The ICSID provides a
neutral forum for arbitrating investment disputes between foreign in-
221. Nichols, Extension of Standing, supra note 12, at 313.
222. Some commentators also mention NAFTA's antidumping provisions and the
Nordic Convention as possible models for private access to the wrO. See Shell, Trade
Legalism, supra note 62, at 887, 917. As discussed above, however, these agreements
link private access to the domestic law of each nation, and the WTO is too far-reach-
ing and diverse for such a system. See supra text accompanying notes 206-11.
223. See Jackson, Tokyo Round, supra note 153, at 207-08; Montafit i Mora, supra
note 25, at 161-62; Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 62, at 889-90.
224. See Charnovitz, supra note 149, at 348; Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 62, at
916-17.
225. See Jackson, Tokyo Round, supra note 153, at 207-08; Montahi1 i Mora, supra
note 25, at 161.
226. See Charnovitz, supra note 149, at 349; Young, supra note 64, at 406 & n.77.
227. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Na-
tionals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Conven-
tion]; Malcolm D. Rowat, Multilateral Approaches to Improving the Investment
Climate of Developing Countries: The Cases of ICSID and MIGA, 33 Harv. Int'l L.J.
103, 106 (1992).
23051997]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
vestors and host countries.' An investor has a right to arbitration
only if the initial investment agreement between the investor and the
host country explicitly provides for ICSID arbitration.' 9 Essentially,
nations are in no way compelled to use ICSID arbitration.2 30 Further-
more, the ICSID Convention allows nations to remove entire classes
of disputes from ICSID jurisdiction.23'
The ICSID does not raise serious standing concerns-in order for
an investor to sue a nation, the nation must expressly grant that inves-
tor permission to do so. Such a system would be unworkable in the
context of the WTO. Requiring nations to explicitly consent to suit
before the WTO for each individual case would lead to inequitable
enforcement of trade agreements. Larger nations could use their
political power and economic clout to refuse to consent, while less
developed nations would be effectively forced to consent in order to
attract much-needed capital .2 32 This power-based outcome would sap
the system of the predictability that the WTO has sought to achieve.
The ILO is the primary international organization concerned with
protecting the rights of workers around the world. 33 Its primary func-
tion is the establishment of labor standards and the monitoring of in-
ternational compliance with these standards.' Under the ILO
Constitution, workers' organizations can raise "representations of
non-observance" against nations alleged to be in violation of the re-
quired labor standards.-3 5 Individual workers cannot bring com-
plaints, and a complaint from a workers' organization is only
considered if this organization is deemed by the ILO to be
authentic.' 36
The approach taken by the ILO dispute resolution system is inappli-
cable to the WTO. Extending standing to workers' organizations is
not nearly as drastic as extending it to individuals and corporations.
Workers' organizations will be subject to the same political influences
228. ICSID Convention, supra note 227, art. 1, at 162; Rowat, supra note 227, at
107.
229. ICSID Convention, supra note 227, art. 25, at 174; Rowat, supra note 227, at
108.
230. Rowat, supra note 227, at 108.
231. Id.
232. This imbalance is less problematic in the ICSID context because the ICSID
was established for the specific purpose of "reduc[ing] the political risks constraining
increased foreign direct investment" in less developed countries. Id. at 105.
233. Daniel S. Ehrenberg, The Labor Link: Applying the International Trading Sys-
tem to Enforce Violations of Forced and Child Labor, 20 Yale J. Int'l L. 361, 381
(1995).
234. Id. at 381-82.
235. International Labour Office, Constitution of the International Labour Organi-
sation and Standing Orders of the International Labour Conference, art. 24; see Eh-
renberg, supra note 233, at 385-86.
236. See Ehrenberg, supra note 233, at 407. The authenticity of a workers' organi-
zation depends on "several factors, including the organization's charter and bylaws,
membership, and history." Id
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that nations are and may be hesitant to file some claims in order to
protect their relationship with the offending nation. In order for pri-
vate parties to adequately protect their interest in free trade with a
minimum of political interference, the WTO needs to make standing
available at the individual level, not the organizational level.
B. Standing for Any Entity that Suffers Harm
The direct harm of a nation's protectionist trade practices is borne
by the private entities who are doing business with that nation. In
order for these private parties to be confident that illicit trade prac-
tices will be corrected with sufficient speed and reliability, the WTO
dispute resolution system needs to be available to them. In other ar-
eas of international law, private parties do, in fact, have standing to
raise claims before international tribunals. In addition, U.S. courts
regularly hear claims raised by private parties regarding the discrimi-
natory trade practices of U.S. states. An analysis of the various stand-
ing levels of these tribunals will be helpful in determining the proper
threshold for the WTO.
1. Standing for Prospective Harm
Some tribunals allow standing for private parties who have not suf-
fered actual harm, but for whom injury is imminent or prospective.
Two such tribunals are the European Convention on Human Rights
and the U.S. federal courts in the context of the negative Commerce
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
The European Convention on Human Rights,137 which most Euro-
pean nations have ratified, contains certain guarantees of basic human
rights. An individual who has been a victim of a violation of these
rights can file a claim with the European Commission of Human
Rights."3 In order to sue, the individual must have been directly af-
fected by the violation.239 For the purposes of standing, the Commis-
sion has expanded the definition of "victim" to include a potential or
eventual victim? 4°
A similar standard is applied by U.S. courts in evaluating constitu-
tional claims under the U.S. Commerce Clause. The Commerce
Clause of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate
interstate commerce.2 1 Courts have inferred from this positive grant
237. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention].
238. Id art 25, at 236-38.
239. See Richard Desgagn6, Integrating Environmental Values into the European
Convention on Human Rights, 89 Am. J. Int'l L 263, 284 (1995). Moreover, as a
prerequisite to filing a claim with the Commission, the individual must have ex-
hausted all national remedies in the offending nation. European Convention, supra
note 237, art. 26, at 238; see Desgagn6, supra, at 265 n.18.
240. Desgagn6, supra note 239, at 284-85.
241. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
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of power a limitation on the ability of states to discriminate against or
inhibit interstate trade.242 This doctrine is known as the negative
Commerce Clause.243
Plaintiffs in negative Commerce Clause cases technically face the
same standing requirement of all plaintiffs-they must have suffered
an "injury in fact."'2 " The injury can be either actual or imminent, but
a general expectation of being injured at some point in the future is
insufficient.245 In applying the negative Commerce Clause, however,
courts have rarely addressed this issue and have taken an expansive
view of standing. The courts "either fail[ ] to look closely for any in-
jury... or hypothesize[ ] some injury from the challenged discrimina-
tion. 21 46 In effect, the courts have determined that the required injury
is the loss of an opportunity to compete equally for market share.247
In the context of the WTO, allowing private parties to raise claims
for prospective injuries would be too broad a standard. Such a stan-
dard would allow everyone who could potentially do business in a na-
tion to attack that nation's trade practices. Standing for prospective
injury is adequate for the European Union and for the United States
because the nations of the European Union and the U.S. states have
given up much more of their autonomy than the nations of the world
would be willing to give up to the WTO.
Some commentators have argued that the Supreme Court's expan-
sive view of standing under the negative Commerce Clause under-
mines state democratic processes and violates federalist principles.248
Whatever the validity of this view with respect to the states, it is clear
that a similar standard for the WTO would represent an unprece-
dented and unwarranted intrusion into the autonomy of the member
nations. Moreover, allowing standing for prospective human rights vi-
olations is necessary because such violations will normally be irrevers-
ible; in contrast, economic harm, such as that resulting from restrictive
trade practices, is rectifiable, so there is no danger in requiring private
parties to actually suffer harm before raising a claim before the WTO.
2. Standing Limited to Those Actually Harmed
Private-party standing before the WTO, therefore, should be lim-
ited to those who have suffered actual harm due to a nation's allegedly
illicit trade practices. A model of this standard's application in inter-
242. Lisa Heinzerling, The Commercial Constitution, 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 217, 223.
243. Id.
244. See id. at 264.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 264-65.
247. Id. at 265. The Supreme Court has gone even farther than this, and allowed
entities that are not even in interstate commerce to sue based on the discriminatory
practices of others in their community. Id. at 266-67.
248. Daniel A. Farber, State Regulation and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 3
Const. Commentary 395, 414 (1986).
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national law is the dispute resolution system provided in the invest-
ment provisions of NAFTA.
Chapter 11 of NAFTA establishes guidelines to ensure the fair
treatment of foreign investors.24 9 If a state-sanctioned monopoly or
state enterprise acts in contravention of chapter 11, then foreign inves-
tors can force the offending nation into arbitration. -0 An investor has
standing to raise a claim if the investor has actually incurred some
form of loss or damage by reason of the alleged breach.2-5 It is clear
that this will not be interpreted to encompass prospective loss or dam-
age because the statute of limitations for filing a complaint starts when
the investor knows or should have known that the loss occurred.2-2
This same standard should be adopted by the WTO as the threshold
for private-party claims. Requiring actual harm caused by an alleged
trade infraction would permit private parties to challenge trade prac-
tices that are actually inhibiting free trade, while keeping frivolous
claims from flooding the system.
C. Screening Mechanism
The WTO should set up a commission to filter out frivolous claims
and advance meritorious ones. This system could be modeled on the
European Commission on Human Rights, which serves as a screening
mechanism for the European Court of Justice.
Under the European Convention, an individual who claims to be a
victim of a human rights violation can raise a complaint before the
European Commission of Human Rights (the "Commission").25 3 If
the complaint is "manifestly ill-founded" or does not allege a prima
facie violation of the complainant's rights, then the Commission dis-
misses it.-54 If the complaint raises a valid claim and all the relevant
prerequisites have been satisfied, the Commission undertakes an in-
vestigation and encourages the parties to reach a "friendly settlement
of the matter on the basis of respect for Human Rights." 2- If parties
cannot reach a settlement, the Commission writes a report recom-
mending the action that should be taken 6 and refers the question to
the European Court of Justice, the actual adjudicator of claims.257
An analogous commission-call it, say, the Commission for Free
Trade (the "CFT")-could be set up by the WTO to serve as a filter
for private-party claims. A private party would file a claim with the
249. See NAFTA, supra note 156, arts. 1101-1139, at 639-48.
250. Id. art. 1116(1), at 642-43; see Charnovitz, supra note 149, at 349.
251. NAFTA, supra note 156, art. 1116(1), at 642-43.
252. IL art. 1116(2), at 643.
253. European Convention, supra note 237, art. 25, at 236-38.
254. Id art. 27, at 238.
255. Id art. 28, at 238-40.
256. Id art. 31, at 240.
257. Id art. 48, at 246.
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CFT detailing the offending trade practice and the specific loss suf-
fered. The CFT would determine whether the objectionable trade
practice presents a prima facie violation of a trade agreement and
whether the complainant has suffered actual damage as a result. If the
claim is meritless, or if the complainant has suffered no actual loss or
damage, the CFT would dismiss the claim.
Before proceeding, the CFT would publicize the existence of the
dispute so that concerned nations and other private parties with stand-
ing would have the option of joining in. Because the impact of any
given trade violation will be fairly widespread, the CFT should have
the ability to consolidate duplicative claims of both private parties and
governments. This could be done either at the outset by the CFT or
later in the dispute by letting eligible parties intervene in existing
cases. This aspect of dispute resolution is not much of a departure
from the present system-the WTO currently has the capability to
consolidate similar claims from different nations,z 8 and nations can
intervene in ongoing disputes.-59
In accordance with the preference for resolving WTO disputes
through initial consultations,26 ° the CFT would then contact the of-
fending nation and encourage the parties to come to some agreement.
Because the goal of the dispute resolution system is to foster free
trade and preserve the integrity of the rules, the offending nation
would not be allowed to buy off the complainant. Any acceptable set-
tlement would have to take the form of a modification of the trade
policy in question.
If the parties come to an agreement that the CFT deems to be a fair
resolution of the dispute, the CFT would draft an order requiring the
offending nation to make the relevant changes. As with panel recom-
mendations,26' this order would become binding unless the member
nations agree by consensus not to adopt it. If the parties fail to come
to an agreement, the CFT would submit the dispute to the existent
WTO dispute resolution system. From that point on, the system
would function as it does now.
Contrary to claims of some commentators, 62 such a system of pri-
vate standing is not unworkable. Due to the CFT's ability to consoli-
date claims, the number of separate disputes will be limited to the
number of trade practices that can be reasonably interpreted as
breaching international agreements. The benefit of private-party
standing is that it will virtually guarantee that diplomatic motives and
258. Understanding, supra note 16, art. 9.
259. Id. art. 10.
260. See id. art. 4 (stating that the first step in a trade dispute should be consulta-
tion between the parties).
261. 1& art. 16(4).
262. See, e.g., Nichols, Extension of Standing, supra note 12, at 313.
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political gamesmanship will not let objectionable trade practices re-
main in place for long.
CONCLUSION
The creation of the WTO was a remarkable step forward in the de-
politicization of the dispute resolution system and the establishment
of a secure, predictable world trade system. But the job is not yet
done, as the current Helms-Burton dispute makes vividly clear. As
long as private parties have to rely on their governments to initiate
and advance trade disputes for them, they will be uncertain about the
future enforcement of trade agreements and will therefore be hesitant
to take full advantage of the benefits of free trade.

